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Jurgen Bast
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Patrycja Dabrowska
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Anna Katharina von Oettingen 

On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking


By Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke
Read this Contribution as a PDF


Suggested Citation: Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 German Law Journal 1341-1370 (2011), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1364

A.  The Relevance of Democratic Legitimation

While the introductory contribution addressed the questions and definitions of our research into judicial lawmaking, this concluding chapter discusses strategies regarding the justification of international judicial lawmaking that our introduction sought to capture and that the volume set out to present.  How can one square such lawmaking with the principle of democracy?  A first response could be to negate the phenomenon.  If there were no such thing as judicial lawmaking, there would evidently be no need for its justification.  This response, though unconvincing, merits attention all the same because, according to the traditional and still widespread view of international dispute settlement, international decisions flow from the consent of the state parties to the dispute, both from the consensual basis of the applicable law and from consent-based jurisdiction.  If state parties are democratic, then the presence of their consent should solve any legitimate question as long as the courts only fulfill their task of dispute settlement properly.  This explains the emphasis that traditional schools of thought place on the cognitive paradigm and on the principle that judges are limited to applying the law to the dispute at hand.